Messay Kebede (PhD.)
The rationale for the TPLF’s current stepping up of repression,
obviously triggered by the coming elections, is hard to comprehend.
Ranging from constant harassments and severe beatings to torture and
long-term imprisonments, the repression particularly targets journalists
and young leaders of opposition parties. The fear of losing the
elections is usually advanced as the main explanation for the heightened
repression. This explanation presupposes that the TFLF is ready to
abide by the verdict of the ballot boxes and step down if the majority
is against it. Nothing is more remote than the TPLF peacefully handing
power over to the opposition subsequent to an electoral defeat.
Let us therefore reformulate the explanation: The TPLF is not so much
afraid of electoral defeat, which it has no intention of respecting, as
of the implications of elections. It has been said again and again:
elections have consequences, even when they are not democratic. In the
case of Ethiopia, the possibility of protests and riots cannot be
excluded, given the widespread unpopularity of the ruling party. Indeed,
if the TPLF refuses to recognize the results of elections or engages in
last minutes maneuvering to rig the results, it is sure to have, as
shown in the 2005 elections, riots in its hands, especially in urban
areas.
To squash the uprisings, the TPLF will have to engage in open and
bloody confrontations with rioters in urban streets. It is this kind of
confrontation that the TPLF wants to avoid at all costs because it
exposes its true nature to the world, especially to Western governments
whose support is dependent on Western public opinion. Moreover, this
kind of open and wide confrontation seriously undermines, in the eyes of
Ethiopians themselves, the legitimacy that the regime claims to have.
Nothing unmasks more a democratic façade than a regime compelled to hunt
down protesters in the streets the day after an election.
Hence the decision to heighten repression in order to escort the
coming elections with an atmosphere of fear designed either to force
some challenging parties to opt out of the competition or to cripple
them enough so that they cease to appear as possible alternatives to the
existing ruling elite. In addition to the general purpose of
intimidating voters, fear has two functions: it paralyzes competing
parties and deprives the country of credible alternatives, thus
compelling voters to vote out of desperation. When voting is without
alternative, what choice do people have but to renew the existing ruling
party? Short of banning parties altogether, one way of maintaining
legitimacy for the status quo is by preventing the rise of opposition
parties showing some potential through a systematic repression.
The paradox, however, is that the more repression is successful, the
greater becomes the likelihood of violent protests and riots. By both
discouraging opposition parties and inculcating in the minds of people
the futility of elections, repression removes any hope for a peaceful
and democratic change. What is more, it convinces many people of the
necessity of armed struggle and violent uprising to dislodge a regime
increasingly perceived as dictatorial. In other words, the more the TPLF
shows its utter unwillingness to tolerate the rise of challenging
parties, the more it pushes the country toward violent confrontations.
Be it noted that the reason why the TPLF is not banning rival political
parties––which would be a more consistent move given its utterly
undemocratic nature––is not only that such a decision will be ill
received by Western governments, but also because the semblance of
democratic competition keeps the mind of people away from the idea of
violent and armed uprisings. So long as people believe that there is a
possibility of changing government policy through electoral means, they
will hang on to the hope, however remote the possibility may be.
That is why I ask the question: if repression only strengthens the
probability of violent uprisings, then how is one to explain that the
TPLF finds it feasible? After all, the assumption that the leaders of
the TPLF are unaware of the danger of continued repression is hardly
credible. My conjecture is that, though aware of the consequences of
continued repression, the leaders of the TPLF have persuaded themselves
that repression gives them the time they need to rally the support of
the Ethiopian people.
The question is then to know why TPLF leaders believe that buying
time is for them a way out. The answer lies in the economic policy of
the regime, which policy is presumed to require time to show concrete
results. Once ordinary people start to feel the tangible benefits of the
policy, they will willingly support the government, thereby removing
the need for repressive means. What must be understood, according to
these leaders, is that to launch Ethiopia into a sustained and rapid
economic growth, deep structural changes are necessary. Unfortunately,
such changes cannot but be disruptive, even negatively affecting the
conditions of life of ordinary people. Such downsides, though temporary,
cause frustration and unpopularity, which opposition parties use to
galvanize the people against the government and the ruling party. As a
true reformist party, the TPLF, so its leaders believe, is vulnerable to
attacks by demagogues, populists, and revengeful parties.
This sense of vulnerability explains why the late Meles has been so
vocal against neoliberalism and in favor of the authoritarian and
interventionist alternative of the developmental state. In the name of
democracy, the liberal model destabilizes those ruling parties committed
to real reforms by forcing them to compete against demagoguing
political parties. Referring to Meles’s critique of liberal democracy,
Tsehai Alemayehu writes: “electoral democracy is prone to frequent
changes in government and hence to instability in the policy
environment.”
[1] The solution is a democratic system monitored by “a dominant party or dominant coalition democracy”
[2]
Put otherwise, yes to multipartism, but with the proviso that
opposition parties are not allowed to become a menace to the dominant
ruling party.
To understand the high vulnerability of ruling parties committed to
structural changes, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that
such changes must give full priority to big infrastructural projects.
Speaking of the ideology inspiring the Ethiopian ruling elite, Daniel
Teferra writes: “there has to be massive investment in modern
infrastructure, such as, power plants, good roads, etc. Furthermore, the
theory believes that to justify investment, all the infrastructural
projects have to be carried out simultaneously.”
[3]
Since Ethiopia cannot afford to finance the projects, the required
“massive investment . . . has to be borrowed from outside sources.”
[4]
The priority given to grand projects and structural changes
inevitably works at the expense of the much needed but ranked secondary
policy of improvement of the conditions of life of the working people
and the elimination of poverty. It can even be directly hurtful by
causing displacements, as in the case of the lease of vast lands for
export purposes necessitated by the need to pay off external debts. All
these downsides are unavoidable consequences of the effort to lay down
the infrastructures for a real and sustainable economic takeoff.
Unfortunately, they are politically poisonous for the ruling party,
which then has no choice but to put a lid, in the name of progress and
the common good, on the activities of opposition parties.
This justification of repression, that is, the belief that electoral
changes would halt progress by empowering demagogues, populists, and
revanchists is hardly new. It is a revamp of the Soviet style advocacy
of the postponement of democracy until the working people reach a
certain level of economic satisfaction and political awareness. Unlike
the Soviet style formula, however, the version of Meles does not go to
the extent of banning opposition political parties; it allows them to
operate but under restricted conditions that practically blocks their
ability to become serious contenders. The existing party must be the
dominant party, not the only party. In addition to being indispensable
to obtain generous Western investments, the existence of opposition
parties is a safety valve necessary to reduce social tensions by opening
outlets for a peaceful venting of grievances. Without this mechanism,
the dislocations and hardships accompanying the implementation of
structural changes would cause riots and undermine the smooth
functioning of the developmental state.
So analyzed, it is almost impossible not to see the stumbling block
of this program of political endurance, namely, the undeniable fact that
the regime is devoid of the very means necessary to bring about
economic progress with tangible benefits for the working people. What
the TPLF needs is not more time, but urgent corrections and reforms,
which it seems utterly unable to undertake. My aim here is not to
discuss whether the path of grandiose projects is feasible or not for
economic growth and development; rather, it is point out the grave
deficiencies blocking the implementation of the economic program and
hence undermining the goal of the political survival of the TPLF.
Since the development strategy prioritizes big projects over the
immediate concerns of the people, it does little to reduce the pressure
of unemployment, especially on the young. Nor does it alleviate the
rising rate of inflation, the consequence of which is that people have
the distinct impression of a downward slide in their ability to satisfy
their most urgent needs. Such drawbacks cannot but aggravate the
frustration of people and put them in a state of virtual uprising that
no governmental propaganda can overcome. This is to say that the whole
system is at the mercy of an incident that can spread like bushfire.
More time would not reduce the problem for the simple reason that the
regime produces incompetence at an alarming degree. For the economic
program to work, it requires a devoted and professional cadre at all
levels of the implementation. But the fulfillment of this condition is
all the more questionable in light of the politicization of the entire
educational system and the unabated deterioration of the quality of
education, not to mention the massive exodus of educated and trained
people. Such an educational system can only produce incompetent and
self-serving people who advance their own interests through corruption
and embezzlement, which seriously hamper the economic program. By the
very fact that the system rejects the merit-based selective effect of
free market and free political competition, it encourages a form of
recruitment that proliferates clientelism, mostly of ethnic nature, and
with it inefficiency, wastage, and unaccountability. To the extent that
political patronage extends immunity, these behaviors find no means for
correction and become endemic to the point of reaching absolute
dysfunctionality. In short, there appears a huge contradiction between
the economic program and the human component that is supposed to
materialize the program, leaving no other choice than a complete
reliance of the regime on repression.
In default of an efficient and inclusive system, there goes away the
ability of the country to pay off its debts. Since the fight against
poverty has been postponed in favor of big projects, both clientelism
and the inevitable proliferation of corruption and embezzlement
concentrate wealth in the hands of the co-opted few. Without a
sustained growth of internal consumption and an export sector able to
compete in international markets, the economic machine cannot yield
enough revenues to settle the increasing debts of the country. As Seid
Hassan and his co-writers stated in a recently posted article, “for a
developing and landlocked country like Ethiopia which is trapped in a
quagmire of mega projects while at the same time facing low capital
formation due to its low productivity, low income and low savings. . . .
relying on weak export sector . . . ., the expected foreign exchange
earnings capacity of the economy” cannot take the country out of “the
vicious circles of debt.”
[5]
As the economic expectations falter, the dependence of the regime on
repressive violence increases. This is the stage reached by the TPLF
right now: an all-out repression must not only be maintained, but it
must also be the more tightened the more the promised economic benefits
prove elusive. The one possibility that could stop this rapid slide into
total repression would be to undertake reforms. But this is a path that
is entirely closed, as shown by the fiasco of the short lived
anti-corruption campaign. Those who are in control seem unwilling or
unable to critically review some of Meles’s options. Nor does the regime
possess the qualified personnel necessary to undertake a course
correction. Moreover, the whole system is too corrupt and too trapped in
its failings to be able to renew itself.
Again, only the path of increased and systematic repression is left.
The purpose is no longer to buy time for economic growth, since the
failure of expectations has plunged the country into a virtual state of
uprising, but merely to survive politically, to retain state power by
any means. This survival goal rests solely on one article of faith,
namely, that repression will be enough to keep the people subdued.
Accordingly, all attention must be given to the strengthening and
expansion of the repressive forces. Notably, the major purpose of the
economy must be to provide the financial means to strengthen the
repressive power and satisfy its large staff, including the numerous
members of the coalition of parties, the EPRDF, whose main function is
to exercise a tight control over the entire society. In so thinking,
the leaders of the TPLF forget that the road of total repression digs
their own grave: the strengthening of repression can only sound the
knell of peaceful struggle in Ethiopia, thereby making violent uprisings
inevitable. Repression may work when it yields some tangible results,
not when it is all stick without any carrot.
[1] Tsehai Alemayehu, “The Ethiopian Developmental State: Requirements and Perquisites,”
Journal of Business & Economics Research, vol.7, no. 8 (2009), p. 13.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Daniel Teferra, “Ethiopia: International Borrowing and Its Consequences,”
hhttp://www.ethiomedia.com…
[4] Ibid.
[5] Seid Hassan, Minga Negash, Tesfaye T. Lemma and Abu Girma Moges, “Is Ethiopia’s Sovereign Debt Sustainable?
http://www.pambazuka.net…
–
Messay Kebede is Professor of Philosophy at the University of
Dayton in Ohio. He taught philosophy at Addis Ababa University from 1976
to 1993. He also served as chair of the department of philosophy from
1980 to 1991.
